Northern Cyprus: What now? : by Yavuz Baydar
For years, the pro-solution dynamic has been unchanged on the northern part of the divided island of Cyprus. What is more, this dynamic has been, to a great extent, unmoved by the ongoing turbulence -- a power struggle still without an end -- in Turkey.
For more than five years, Turk Cypriot voters gave their support to a leftist political movement, the Republican Turks Party (CTP), for reunification, for a final settlement with the Greek Cypriot South, for a lifting of the isolation and for achieving political equality and rights both domestically and in the EU.
The elections last Sunday signaled a drastic change of heart in the North. The choice of the National Unity Party (UBP), a right-wing movement, clearly indicates strong disillusionment with what they see as "discriminating behavior" of the EU and the failures of the CTP in economic and administrative reform. The CTP under Ferdi Sabit Soyer has raised expectations in many areas, but the disappointment became obvious.
What will happen now? As is well known by now, the Cyprus issue is the key for not only President Mehmet Ali Talat's future or only for the prosperity, security and equality of Turk Cypriots, but for the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government in Ankara. It is the only political leverage left for Turkey to turn the tide within the EU.
The elections do display a change, but not everything has changed. The UBP can now build a one-party government with 26 seats, but as its leader Derviş Eroğlu told us last week, this will make the UBP fragile and him "dependent" on the will of his deputies. In consideration of that, Eroğlu might seek a two-party coalition.
President Talat is leading the talks with his counterpart (and comrade!), Dimitris Christofias -- a mandate given to him until the elections in the Turk Cypriot North in April of next year. Talat and Christofias are conducting negotiations based on documents they signed and within the parameters of the island as a unified federal state, as per the agreement of the two constituent states. The Parliament in the North can, if it so desires, change the framework of the talks previously given to the president.
In that sense, Talat has reasons to be seriously concerned. Because Eroğlu made it clear that he does not favor a federal solution based on political equality, but prefers a confederal solution -- after the agreement of what he calls "two founding states" -- based on "equality of sovereignty." Lately he has watered it down somewhat, but he still keeps the door open to the option he favors.
What should be more of a concern to Talat is the pledge of Eroğlu to the voters that the UBP will abolish "The Immovable Property Commission," which has the approval of the European Court of Human Rights and has given partial legitimacy to the Turk Cypriot administration. This has been taken as a further pledge that the UBP will start to "distribute Greek Cypriot property" again, in which case Christofias might leave the talks with Talat altogether.
Eroğlu was keen to send conciliatory messages both to Talat and the AK Party government that he supports continued talks and a solution. Yet, this should not be taken as a guarantee that Eroğlu will not demand to be represented by his foreign minister in the talks or, at least, be kept fully and constantly informed.
Certainly, Eroğlu knows that both Turkey's President Abdullah Gül and the AK Party government stand firmly behind Talat. More than was expected, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan warned, in strict language, that nothing should be done to disrupt the talks. Neither should it be attempted to change the established parameters of them, he added.
This is a severe caution to Eroğlu to cooperate with the civilian authorities in Ankara and not to rock the boat, which is already rocking because of other major matters in Turkey. Erdoğan obviously knows that as pressurized as his party is due to domestic turbulence, not only the opposition but also the anti-AK Party establishment will consider using the new situation as powerful leverage to weaken his power. For its part, the AK Party may "complicate" the distribution of the annual $500 million in aid to the North.
Perhaps the bigger question is whether or not the EU will be able to grasp the true meaning of the change in northern Cyprus. It has failed before. Totally misled because of political blindness on some parts and political cynicism on the other, fed by maximalist/revanchist propaganda machinery of Greek Cypriot governments and unable to value Ankara's historic change in 2004, the EU should now seize the opportunity to revise its policies vis-à-vis the Turk Cypriots. Had it been less rigid and cleverer, it would have lifted the sanctions long ago and thereby minimized the dependency of northern Cyprus on Ankara; it would have made that part of the island closer to the EU and closer to a solution. In that case, it would have produced a different mood in the voters.
The election results are, therefore, not only a severe warning to the EU, but also to Christofias. The Greek Cypriot's space for cunning maneuvering has come to an end. It will not be able to convincingly claim that the Turk Cypriots have turned their backs on a solution. Had it been reasonably cooperative, instead of blocking even most humane moves in favor of reaching out, the "climate" would remain also in their favor.
All the parts should realize that Cyprus is much closer to the crossroads. Let us see what the EU will do now.